Iran Plan for Iraq

Counterterrorism Blog:

Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C., and director of the Future Terrorism Project.

Dr. Phares has sketched a very grim outline of Iran's plan for Iraq, should the United States "catastrophically" withdraw from Iraq before that nation's government stabilizes and can defend itself. Grim is a euphemistic description of the future Phares believes Iran has in store:

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1) The pro-Iranian militias (SCIRI, Badr Brigade, Muqtada al Sadr, act.) would seize the control of two thirds of Iraq between Baghdad and Basra. The militias would create "security enclaves," perform several terror acts and assassinations leading to a crumbling of the central Government, and a pro-Khomeinist regime established.

2) Most moderate Shiite politicians and liberal elements in those areas would be eliminated, as did Khomeini with his partners in the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Within less than a year, most Shia partners of the Pro-Iranian forces would be eliminated.

3) And as it was practiced in Lebanon in 1990, the pro-Iranian future regime of Iraq will call in Iranian "brotherly" forces to assist in security and in the defense of the borders. The Pasdaran and the Iranian army will deploy in the southern Oil fields, along the borders with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan and would connect with the Syrian forces across the borders. The latter will be asked to help in the Anbar province.

4) The Sunni areas will be left to be dealt with later, along with Syrian interventions.

5) The Kurdish areas will be submitted to isolation, pressure and internal divisions, in a concerted effort with Syria and the Islamic Government of Turkey.

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In this post, I noted the strategic objectives remaining for the U.S. led coalition:

1) Complete the neutralization of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

2) Flip Moqtada al-Sadr and bring his militias into the coalition fold (al-Sistani's Badr Brigades are not fighting the coalition).

3) Eliminate or neutralize the Iranian backed JAM forces.

A fourth strategic objective should be discussed--crippling Iran's ability to supply finance and logistics support to its proxy forces in Iraq. Sooner or later, the U.S. will have to draw down and leave a largely special forces and civil affairs COIN presence. When that happens, we have to make sure that Iran does not step in and attempt to fill the void. We can not let Iran gain another ounce of influence, and we can not let them solidify anything gained to date.

Dr. Phares probably has a stronger basis for wariness of al-Sistani's Badr militia than I do. I frankly don't see al-Sistani as an Iranian puppet mullah, as he threw his support in with the new government fairly early on. It was al-Sadr who seemed to be the chief ally of Iran in Iraq, which is why flipping him becomes so important.

Very interesting, and clearly critical, times lie ahed.

Read Dr. Phares full article.

"We are from all over Iraq."

BAGHDAD — The strength of any democracy is the equal representation of various cultural interests; thus, the power of a military force can be measured by diversity as well. American culture takes pride in boasting equal opportunity in public service roles.

Iraqi culture mirrors this attitude, and the warriors of the Iraqi Army’s 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division – currently conducting a force integration with Battalion Landing Team 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines – are a simple, flawless example of strength in diversity.

Speaking from an office at Combat Outpost Golden in Al Anbar Province here, Iraqi Army Col. Ali Jassimi, 1st battalion commanding officer, explained the cultural representation within his unit.

“My staff is Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish. We have officers from many different areas of Iraq; Mosul, Baghdad, Ramadi – and we’re all here working together,” he said. “There are many people around the world who would think this would be a problem. We are a perfect example that it is not.”

Jassimi, a native of southern Iraq, said there is a preconceived notion in some global media circles that various sectarian issues create problems within the new Iraqi Army. To combat this, he said, he avoids prejudice by ignoring religious preference altogether.

“When I get a new officer, I do not ask him if he is Shiite or Sunni. I don’t care,” he said.

The recent history of the diverse organization’s success in Falluja (a primarily Sunni area), conducting security and stability operations is a testament to the camaraderie of junior enlisted troops (Juundis) who come from all walks of life, said Jassimi.

“We’ve had great success in Falluja, and it’s because of the Juundis-- they’re all brothers,” he said.

The colonel went on to explain that junior enlisted troops in his battalion ignored sectarian issues during operations.

“If anyone needed help, we helped them. We visited mosques, and no matter if it was Shiite or Sunni, we prayed with them,” Jassimi said.

Iraqi Army Captain Mustafa Al Jaaf, a Kurdish staff member of 1/2/1, echoed his commander’s sentiments.

“We are from all over Iraq, and it makes a stronger force. You can see now Falluja is a much safer place,” Jeaf said.

Originally from Ramadi, Iraqi Army Capt. Basim Ashumari said his anger over foreign fighters – Al Qaeda subordinates historically from Egypt, Jordan and Syria – caused him to join the new Iraqi Army and fight for his countrymen, no matter what religion they were.

“In Ramadi, I saw men from another country come and kill civilians, so I decided to join the new Iraqi Army. No matter what religion they are, these officers here are on a mission to keep the Iraqis safe. We are one team with one goal,” Ashumari said.

U.S. Marine Lt. Col. Woody Hesser, Military Transition Team commander, said within the MTT, the ethos of “one team, one fight” is clearly evident during joint operations. Hesser and his team have shadowed 1st Battalion since January, and he says with each patrol a shared interest in Iraqi security is obvious.

“We’re here fighting a war, and when we go on patrol, it’s one fight. There have never been any sectarian issues,” Hesser said. “Really, it’s almost like another Marine unit taking over, but it’s not about Marines and Iraqis, it’s about good guys versus bad guys.”

As Marines have always kept close the ethos of “brothers in arms,” the Iraqi Army shares the exact ideal. During a nightly dinner with 1st Battalion staff, uniforms and language are the only visible difference between 3/1 Marines and Iraqi Army forces here. The staff laughs, jokes and singles out members with good-natured scrutiny. At the end of the night, they shake hands and go on with business. Officers constantly duck in to the commander’s office to have forms signed and plans authorized. The parallels between US and Iraqi forces are striking.

For the Iraqi Army, however, it is not a mimicking act – it is an old way of life.

“I’m from the north and I’m a Sunni,” began Iraqi Army Maj. Istabraq Ashawani. “That man over there,” he gestured, “is a Shiite. That man over there is Kurdish … everyone in this battalion is a family. We eat together, sleep together and pray together. Anything you hear on the news about us being different is not true,” he exclaimed. “Ask any Juundi or officer … we’re all the same.”

(Story by U.S. Marines Sgt. Andy Hurt 13th MEU)

Iraqi Provincial Volunteers help secure Radwaniyah

Multi-National Force - Iraq:

Saturday, 01 September 2007
By Spc. Ben Washburn
4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Public Affairs

BAGHDAD — The goal has always been to return control back to the Iraqis. In recent months, an increasing number of Iraqis have stood up to the challenge of reclaiming their country from terrorists and insurgents by joining the Iraqi Provincial Volunteers.

A trip with the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Briagde, 1st Infantry Division, attached to 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Inf. Div., into Radwaniyah provides a glimpse of what is happening not just there, but in other parts of the country. There, IPVs are manning checkpoints along the roads to stop al-Qaida and insurgents from operating in their area.

Their checkpoints are often simple. A few sandbags piled up into a makeshift bunker. Some rubble or scrap metal pulled across the street to force cars to slow down. Whatever supplies they can scrounge up, with a bit of assistance from the Coalition force, is all it takes for them to secure their roads. The IPVs work throughout the day, through the heat and the sun, to secure their own neighborhoods.

“It’s a big step towards giving control back to the people. I feel a lot safer.” said Spearfish, S.D., native Spc. Russell Harmon, a team leader with Company C, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, attached to Company E, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment.

“There’s a lot more of them. They’re a lot more organized,” said Pfc. Anthony Mondelli, a gunner with Company C, 1-28 Inf. The IPVs are making progress, despite their limited resources. As the time passes, they will be more able to protect their roads and neighborhoods. They’ve done a great job so far, forcing the insurgents to stay away.

“We drive around now and don’t even get shot at. I think it’s because of them,” the gunner and native from Copiague, N.Y., said.

Because the IPVs are from the area they guard, they know who is and who is not from the area. That’s a big advantage that the Coalition force doesn’t have, and is one reason the IPVs are better able to control the checkpoints than anyone brought in from outside the area, one non-commissioned officer said.

It’s that knowledge which has forced the insurgents to stay away. Sgt. 1st Class John McGlothin, of Company C, 1-28 Inf., said that’s why they are effective.

“The reason it works so well with them is they know the people who live in their area. So if we get someone that’s not from the area around, they’re going to be the first to know it,” said the platoon sergeant from Bradford, Ohio.

The IPVs do more than just secure the roads to keep insurgents out. They have proven reliable in preventing improvised explosive devices.

“We don’t have to concentrate on route clearance as much,” Harmon said. By allowing the Coalition force to concentrate more on finding insurgents and weapons caches, the IPVs have proven themselves to be a combat multiplier for the Coalition force.

The residents of Radwaniyah also see the increased security, feeling more comfortable out of their homes and on the roads.

“A big difference is we see people out on the roads. When we first got here we saw a lot less people,” Mondelli said. The people realize that violence doesn’t have to be a way of life.

“I think they finally realize there could be hope for the country, and they’re just trying to do their part,” said Pfc. Christopher Novak, a gunner from Stewart, Fl., assigned the 1-28 Inf.

The IPVs have done a great job since they began manning checkpoints.

“So far they’ve been really successful, very few incidents since we stood them up. Things seem to be getting quieter,” McGlothin said.

Despite the success, the most important aspect is that it’s the Iraqis taking charge of security and allowing the Coalition force to step back and assist where necessary. Radwaniyah is just one area, but is a sign of hope for all of Iraq.

Mondelli summed it up with one sentence.

“It’s been a dramatic change since they’ve been here.”

Culminating Point

In his seminal book, On War, Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz refers to a point in any military campaign at which the outcome becomes known and inevitable. In medieval times, it typically happened when one side or the other, under flag of truce, asked permission to collect the bodies of its dead. In the Napoleanic Wars, it came when the English or Russian armies found the knapsacks (in which they carried everything needed to sustain the fight) abandoned by the rapidly retreating French troops. The time at which the outcome is decided is when the truce is agreed upon. That is different from the point at which the victor realizes that the battle is done and the day is his.

Counterinsurgency, while still at least partially a warfighter's task, does not have the characteristics of large, conventional military campaigns. Al Qaeda is not likely to ride up under a white flag of parlay and ask permission to collect their dead. There will still be a Clausewitzian "culminating point," and signs are that the point is nearing. In COIN, that point will come somewhere between an apex of offensive operations aimed at securing the populace from the insurgency and the turning over of security to indigenous forces. From a military strategy standpoint, the culminating point of victory comes when the enemy realizes that his own culminating point of victory will be denied to him. It comes at the point at which he realizes that he cannot win; that he can not achieve his objectives by force of arms.

How will the enemy learn that his culminating point will be denied him? When the populace determines that his is not the righteous cause and shifts almost wholly to the counterinsurgency. Some of those promising signs are showing up in Iraq, now. Consider:

• Al-Qaeda faces rebellion from the ranks
  Sickened by the group’s barbarity, Iraqi insurgents are giving information to coalition forces


• Iraqi tribes reach security accord: Sunni and Shiites join to fight Al Qaeda


• Al-Qaeda on the Run: Feasting on the Moveable Beast

These are just three of the recent developments in the ongoing counterinsurgency in Iraq. In each of these stories, groups of people who had been either fighting with or were subjugated by the real threat in Iraq--Al Qaeda--have turned against the islamists and are now pointing their weapons at the Iraqi affiliate of Osama bin Laden's loosely organized terrorist group. Earlier this year, bloggers and some media outlets began reporting on what was called the "Anbar Awakening," which saw tribal leaders in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province join forces against Al Qaeda. Groups that were shooting at coalition forces on a daily basis began allying themselves with the U.S. led coalition after getting fed up with Al Qaeda's hard line, fundamentalist approach.

Early on in the post-Saddam era, the coalition erred in ignoring and attempting to marginalize the tribal influence in Iraq. It alienated the tribal leaders, and that led some to join forces with the enemy of their perceived enemy. Al Qaeda, however, committed a much graver mistake than mere alienation. They tried to disrupt and reorganize centuries old cultural mores into their brand of radical islamic law. Tribal sheikhs, who even under Saddam wielded considerable influence over local and provincial affairs, found themselves subjected to brutal repression and decided that they'd had enough. When coalition forces rescued a popular and powerful Sunni sheikh and restored him to his tribal region, the tide turned. Al Anbar province is now void of Al Qaeda influence. The populace in Al Anbar, within a matter of weeks, realized that Al Qaeda's islamic fundamentalism was not the righteous cause. The coalition, who finally understood how Arabs function as a society, won the day. The culminating point of victory came when groups like the 1920's Revolutionary Brigade stood shoulder to shoulder with U.S. combat forces, and slew Al Qaeda fighters by the dozens. Sunni and Americans fought together, died together, and denined the enemy his own culmination point.

It is still too early to tell if the culmination point is imminently upon the theater. However, given the fact that the average insurgency lasts between seven and eight years, and given the fact that we have only been fighting this as a COIN operation for about a year and a half, such promising trends like the Anbar Awakening and the developments reported above hold great promise. As the enemy's grip on the populace loosens, the fear of retribution is lessened. As that fear fades, ordinary Iraqis will be emboldened to provide an ever increasing flow of intelligence. Those who are out of place will be pointed out. Roadside IED locations will be reported. Caches of explosives and weapons will be revealed. The process, if it plays out as others before it, will grow somewhat slowly in size and intensity. And then quite suddenly, a "tipping point," a Clauswitzian culmination, will come.

Watch for it. It will be a historic moment.

Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt

Amid all the talk swirling about the "bottom-up" reconciliation phenomemon comes this post from the Small Wars Journal Blog, Dave Kilcullen:

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To understand what follows, you need to realize that Iraqi tribes are not somehow separate, out in the desert, or remote: rather, they are powerful interest groups that permeate Iraqi society. More than 85% of Iraqis claim some form of tribal affiliation; tribal identity is a parallel, informal but powerful sphere of influence in the community. Iraqi tribal leaders represent a competing power center, and the tribes themselves are a parallel hierarchy that overlaps with formal government structures and political allegiances. Most Iraqis wear their tribal selves beside other strands of identity (religious, ethnic, regional, socio-economic) that interact in complex ways, rendering meaningless the facile division into Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish groups that distant observers sometimes perceive. The reality of Iraqi national character is much more complex than that, and tribal identity plays an extremely important part in it, even for urbanized Iraqis. Thus the tribal revolt is not some remote riot on a reservation: it’s a major social movement that could significantly influence most Iraqis where they live.

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Kilcullen's post is a long one, but a worthwhile read nonetheless. It is noteworthy because it addresses some of the issues many observers have identified in questioning the conduct of counterinsurgency in a Muslim country.

The tribal culture among Arabs is older than Islam and while it doesn't necessarily transcend religion, it certainly runs parallel with it. Insulting an Iraqi's faith is likely to get you killed. Insulting an Iraqi's tribe or family carries an identical risk. There are deep sectarian and political divisions in Iraq, but tribal ties may--emphasis on may--be used to overcome the political division enough to mitigate the sectarian differences. Indeed, there are many tribal entities in Iraq that have both Sunni and Shi'a branches. It is a delicate and paradoxical matter that underscores the nature of counterinsurgency, which itself is governed more by paradox than absolute.

David Kilcullen, Ph.D., is a retired Australian Army Lieutenant Colonel. He now holds a Senior Executive Service (SES) position at the U.S. State Department and serves as Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser, MNF-Iraq. It is a civil service position and part of General David Petraeus' staff.

His occasional posts on SWJ Blog are worth waiting for.

Touring with Gen. Petraeus (The Fourth Rail)

Touring with Gen. Petraeus (The Fourth Rail)

Wes Morgan continues his day with Gen. Petraeus at Camp Taji, joint security stations near Husseiniyah and Tarmiyah, and his embassy offices.

Wes Morgan is a talented writer, currently embedded in Iraq at the invitation of General Petraeus. Bill Roggio publishes select dispatches from Wes from time to time at Fourth Rail.